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Abstract 
 
While the Court of Justice of the European Union has approved the European financial assistance 
schemes, the haircut of public creditors appears as a possible next step of escalation in the euro 
debt crisis. This article explores the legal boundaries set by the EU Treaty on such debt 
restructuring. Both the no-bailout clause and the prohibition of monetary state financing are at the 
core of the analysis. In its rulings in Pringle and Gauweiler, the Court specified the meaning of 
these provisions in relation to the conditions governing financial assistance programs. The 
analysis highlights the limitations set by these norms on the scope of potential modes of haircuts 
on public creditors. We find that a haircut on nominal debt would infringe the no-bailout clause 
and the involvement of the ECB would violate the ban on monetary state financing. However, 
there remain other forms of "soft haircuts", such as the lowering of interest rates and the extension 
of terms, which may be compatible with EU law. 
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Introduction 
Over the past few years, the types of financial aid have gradually increased. At the 
start, there were bilateral assistance loans from Member States; then, the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created, as was the European Stability Mecha-
nism (ESM) at a later point; further types were the involvement of private creditors in 
the case of Greece and, finally, the European Central Bank’s (ECB) Securities Markets 
Programme (SMP) covering bond purchases since May 2010 and  the announcement 
by the ECB that it would purchase an unlimited number of government bonds if neces-
sary.1 The European Court of Justice subsequently approved these far-reaching inter-
ventions. Initially, the Court had paved the way, in the Pringle case,2 for the establish-
ment of the ESM. More recently, in Gauweiler, the Court found the European Central 
Bank’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme to be compatible with EU 
law.3 
The broad variety of financial instruments used in the European public debt crisis might 
soon be enhanced by another measure – the involvement of public creditors. While the 
situation on the bond markets has calmed down, the prospects with regard to debt 
                                               
1 Instructively, A. de Gregorio Merino, ‘Legal Developments in the Economic and Monetary Union During 
the Debt Crisis: The Mechanisms of Financial Assistance’, 49 CMLRev (2012) p. 1613-1646. 
2 CJEU 27 Nov. 2012, Case C-370/12, Pringle v Ireland (henceforth: Pringle case); S. Adam and F. J. 
Mena Parras, ‘The European Stability Mechanism through the Legal Meanderings of the Union’s Con-
stitutionalism: Comment on Pringle’, 38 ELRev (2013) p. 848 at p. 860; V. Borger, ‘How the Debt Crisis 
Exposes the Development of Solidarity in the Euro Area’, 9 EuConst (2013) p. 7 at p. 16-34; see also 
J.-V. Louis, ‘Guest editorial: The no-bailout clause and rescue package’, 47 CMLRev (2010) p. 971; P. 
Athanassiou, ‘Of Past Measures and Future Plans for Europe's Exit from the Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
What is Legally Possible (and What is Not)’, 36 ELRev (2011) p. 558; R. Palmstofer, ‘To Bail Out or Not 
to Bail Out? The Current Framework of Financial Assistance for Euro Area Member States Measured 
against the Requirements of EU Primary Law’, 37 ELRev (2012) p. 771 at p. 781. 
3 CJEU 16 June 2015, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag (henceforth: 
Gauweiler case). On the compatibility of OMT programmes with EU law, see A. Steinbach, ‘The com-
patibility of the ECB’s sovereign bond purchases with EU law and German constitutional law’, 39 Yale 
Journal of International Law Online (2013) p. 15; V. Borger, ‘Outright Monetary Transactions and the 
stability mandate of the ECB: Gauweiler’, 53 CMLRev (2016) p. 139-196; H. Siekmann, The Legality of 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) of the European System of Central Banks 20 (Institute for Mon-
etary and Financial Stability, Working Paper Series No. 90 2015). 
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sustainability are grim, for Greece in particular. In June 2015, the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) told Greece that its debt sustainability was no longer guaranteed.4 The 
sinister combination of low primary surpluses and insufficient reforms made earlier 
prognoses obsolete, according to the IMF. An unaided return to debt sustainability 
barely seems possible.  
In this situation, a debt cut is more topical than ever before. Even the IMF has spoken 
of the possibility of a so-called "haircut" for Greece. Let us remember that, as early as 
2012, there had already been a debt cut for Greece. At the time, the debt was cut for 
private creditors.5 The private-sector involvement was unprecedented in terms of re-
structured debt volume and aggregate creditor losses.6 It implemented a new legal 
regime, crafting an orderly debt exchange in order to restructure debt dispersed among 
many private creditors.7 
However, none of the previously mentioned financial assistance mechanisms or the 
private debt cut apparently succeeded in bringing Greek debt levels onto a sustainable 
path.8 Currently, several kinds of debt relief involving public creditors are being de-
bated: the extension of maturities of loans; the reduction of interest rates; a transfor-
mation of loans into interest-free bonds; and a debt cut on the nominal value either by 
                                               
4 IMF, Greece, IMF Country Report No. 15/165, 26 June 2015, <www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15165.pdf>, last visited 20 Jan. 2016; cf. also Z. Darvas and P. Hüttl, The Long 
Haul: Debt Sustainability Analysis (Bruegel Working Paper 2014/06). 
5 A. Witte, ‘Greek Bond Haircut: Public and Private International Law and European Law Limits to Uni-
lateral Sovereign Debt Restructuring’, 9 Manchester J. Int'l Econ. L. (2012) p. 307; I. Glinavos, ‘Haircut 
Undone? The Greek Drama and Prospects for Investment Arbitration, Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement’, 5 Journal of International Dispute Settlement (2014) p. 475; IMF, Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing - Recent Developments and Implications for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, 26 April 
2013, <www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf>, last visited 20 Jan. 2016. 
6 J. Zettelmeyer et al., ‘The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy’, 28 Economic Policy (2013) p. 513-
563; see also A. von Bogdandy and M. Goldmann, ‘Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of 
International Public Authority: Towards a Decentralized Sovereign Insolvency Law’, in C. Esposito et al. 
(eds.), Sovereign Financing and International Law (Oxford University Press 2013) p. 39-70. 
7 On the various episodes of debt restructuring in general see F. Sturzenegger and J. Zettelmeyer, Debt 
Defaults and Lessons from a Decade of Crises (MIT Press 2007). 
8 There remains however considerable disagreement on the methodology to compute the debt sustain-
ability, see J. Schumacher and B. Weder di Mauro, Diagnosing Greek debt sustainability: Why is it so 
hard? (Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 26 Aug. 2015). 
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the Member States, the ESM or with regard to the government bonds in the portfolio 
of the ECB.9  
This article examines, as they arise from European primary law, the conditions under 
which an involvement of the public creditors is admissible. The aforementioned Court 
judgements on the ESM and the OMT programme provide insights into the interpreta-
tion of, in particular, Articles 123 and 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union (TFEU). The various instruments implying full or partial haircuts and other 
forms of debt relief shall be assessed and evaluated on this basis. Section 2 examines 
the provision of Article 125 TFEU and the various guises of a possible public creditor 
involvement are assessed on this basis. Section 3 studies the particular case of the 
ECB and the possibility of a debt cut on the government bonds purchased by the ECB. 
Section IV concludes. 
 
The compatibility of involving public creditors with article 125 TFEU  
Applying Article 125 para. 1 TFEU to Public Debt Cuts 
Any financial assistance must be assessed with reference to the no-bailout clause set 
out in Article 125 TFEU. At first sight, Article 125 para. 1 TFEU does not appear to be 
pertinent in the case of a debt relief. After all, the article merely stipulates that the 
European Union and its Member States are neither liable for nor assume the commit-
ments of other Member States. The article thus primarily covers certain financial pay-
ments within a triangle constellation of initial creditor, the debtor state and the debt-
assuming state. The prohibition of “liability” and of “assuming the commitments“ of an-
other Member State seems to presume this triangular relationship.10 
                                               
9 Z. Darvas et al., A Comprehensive Approach to the Euro-Area Debt Crisis (IEHAS Discussion Papers 
MT-DP 2011/10); D. Gros and T. Mayer, Debt reduction without default? (CEPS Policy Brief, No. 
233/February 2011). On further measures see also A. von Bogdandy et al., ‘Verlustrisiko’, Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung (23 July 2015) p. 6. 
10 While the terms „liable for“ and “assume” are used in Article 125 TFEU, the Court refers in Pringle to 
the term that countries “remain responsible to its creditors for its financial commitments", see Pringle 
case, para. 138. Throughout this analysis we use the terms 'remain responsible', 'be liable for' and 
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In consequence, a debt cut that occurs within the bilateral relation between the recipi-
ent country and the donor countries in the eurozone is not covered at first glance. If 
Article 125 para.1 TFEU were to be interpreted this formalistic, however, it would be-
come practically useless, for in such a case financial aid could initially be granted, 
leaving the debt owed to creditors untouched and allowing the recipient state to pay its 
debts with this financial aid. In a second step, the financial aid could then be abated or 
otherwise privileged in the bilateral relation of recipient and lender.  
From this vantage point, the Court’s statement on the ESM in Pringle gives guidance. 
The Court speaks of a "new debt" arising as a result of financial aid from the ESM – 
that is, a new debt of the recipient Member State towards the ESM. This new debt 
arises in addition to the existing debt for which the recipient Member State remains 
responsible.11 In referring to the “new debt” that arises, the Court substantiates its ob-
servation that the ESM, as a lending institution, is not at all liable for the debts of a 
recipient state. In other words: the arising of a new debt is a sine qua non for the donor 
state not being ‘liable’ in the sense of Article 125 para. 1 TFEU. In the case of debt 
relief (at least if the nominal debt is partially remitted), however, this debt would expire. 
Yet, it should not make any difference whether the new debt does not develop in the 
first place (in other words, the money is given to the recipient country as a gift) or 
whether it is remitted at a later point.  
Based on the reasoning in Pringle on the emergence of a “new debt”, loans emitted 
under the ESM do not constitute the assumption of debt within Article 125 TFEU. How-
ever, what is of interest here is the ensuing step, which is not requiring the repayment 
of a loan previously granted (under ESM or other financial aid instruments). Concern-
ing the scope of Article 125 para. 1 TFEU, this provision is applicable in the bilateral 
relationship and in the bilaterally granted debt relief, simply because the debt-assum-
ing country that agrees to the haircut is not only the creditor but it also assumes the 
debt of the recipient state vis-à-vis the debt-assuming country itself.12 These states are 
                                               
'assume commitments' as synonyms describing that one country takes over or extinguishes the debt of 
another country. 
11 Pringle case, para. 139. 
12 It is admitted that from a purely positivistic viewpoint, a haircut is not equivalent to the assumption of 
debt as the debt ceases to exist. However, considering the aim of Article 125 TFEU to prevent debt relief 
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thus both creditors and at the same time debt assumers vis-à-vis another state. First, 
through financial aid, the debt-assuming states have become the creditors of the pro-
gramme countries, either directly (in the case of bilateral loans) or indirectly (in the 
case of financial aid from the ESM). If they cut the debt and by not requiring repayment 
of the loan, they therefore assume the recipient state’s debts to them. In the constella-
tion of debt cutting, therefore, Article 125 para. 1 TFEU requires no triangular relation-
ship. 
Benchmarks of Bailout Prohibition for Creditor Involvement 
There has been a controversial debate about how Article 125 TFEU should be inter-
preted.13 This debate centered, on the one hand, around the interpretation of phrases 
such as "be liable for" and "assume the commitments of" in Article 125 para. 1 TFEU; 
on the other hand, it also considered the role of Article 122 para. 2 TFEU, according 
to which the EU can guarantee financial aid to a Member State in the case of "excep-
tional occurrences".14 The opinion has also been voiced that voluntary help should not 
be covered by the wording of Article 125 para. 1 TFEU.15 Further, a state of emergency 
within the Union,16 a "teleological reduction"17 of Article 125 para. 1 TFEU and the 
European solidarity principle were also brought into the debate.18 
In Pringle, the Court substantiated the terms of this norm by finding that this clause 
was "not intended to prohibit either the Union or the Member States from granting any 
                                               
in order to maintain market pressure, a haircut (i.e. renouncing of the repayment of debt) has the same 
effect as one Member States assuming the debt that another Member State has vis-à-vis a third institu-
tion. 
13 See Steinbach, supra n. 3; Louis, supra n. 2, p. 971; Athanassiou, supra n. 2, p. 558. 
14 Further instructive reading on this discussion can be found in Louis, supra n. 2, p. 971; Palmstofer, 
supra n. 2, p. 781; Adam and Mena Parras, supra n. 2, p. 860; Borger, supra n. 2, p. 16-34; B. Eichen-
green, ‘The Euro’s Never-Ending Crisis’, 110 Current History (2011) p. 91. 
15 P. Behrens, ‘Ist ein Ausschluss aus der Euro-Zone ausgeschlossen?’, EuZW (2010) p. 121. 
16 F. Schorkopf, ‘Gestaltung mit Recht’, Archiv öffentlichen Rechts 136 (2011) p. 323, p. 341. 
17 U. Häde, ‘Die europäische Währungsunion in der internationalen Finanzkrise – An den Grenzen 
europäischer Solidarität?’, Europarecht (2010) p. 856. 
18 C. Calliess, ‘Perspektiven des Euro zwischen Solidarität und Recht – Eine rechtliche Analyse der 
Griechenlandhilfe und des Rettungsschirms’, Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien (ZEuS) 2011, 213, 
250ff. 
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form of financial assistance whatever to another Member State".19 The Court based its 
observation on an analysis that took account of both the systematic interpretation of 
the treaty as well as the original intention of the drafters of the treaty.20 The Court took 
recourse to the preparatory work of the Maastricht Treaty where it found the intention 
to "ensure that the Member States remain subject to the logic of the market" when they 
enter into financial assistance.21 At the core of Article 125 TFEU, as it is interpreted by 
the Court, lies the encouragement of Member States to conduct sound budgetary pol-
icies, ideally incentivised by market pressure, but under certain circumstances also 
through conditionality if financial support is indispensable for financial stability.22 
The Court did not see any budgetary discipline diminishing as a result of the ESM, as 
any stability support may be granted "only when such support is indispensable to safe-
guard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States and 
the grant of the support is subject to strict conditionality appropriate to the financial 
assistance instrument chosen".23 Hence, according to the Court, the market pressure 
logic enshrined in Article 125 para. 1 TFEU is not impaired, as long as one or several 
Member States provide financial aid to another Member State that remains liable for 
its own debts towards its creditors – and provided that the conditionality is suitable to 
incentivize it towards more solid budgetary policies.24 
For a proper evaluation of a public debt relief it is important how the Court characterises 
the conditions under which the financial aid from the ESM is admissible. For apart from 
"strict conditionality",25 every financial aid has to be paid back by the recipient state to 
                                               
19 Pringle case, para. 130; see also Borger, ‘The ESM and the European Court's Predicament in Pringle’, 
14 German Law Journal (2013) p.113 at p. 117. 
20 F. Fabbrini, ‘The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the Political Process in Comparative 
Perspective’, 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law (2014) p. 98. 
21 Pringle case, para. 136; Craig, ‘Pringle: Legal Reasoning, Text, Purpose and Teleology’, 20 Maastricht 
Journal of European and Comparative Law (2013) p. 3. 
22 See also Adam and Mena Parras, supra n. 2, p. 860; Borger, supra n. 2, p.16-34; Eichengreen, supra 
n. 9, p. 91. 
23 Pringle case, para. 142. 
24 Pringle case, para. 137. 
25 Pringle case, para. 136. 
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the ESM, and the sum that is due must be increased by an “appropriate margin”.26 The 
Court does not explicitly refer to the payment and margin (by which interest is meant) 
as a necessary precondition for the legality of the financial aid. However, we must 
assume that this is what is meant, since the Court uses this point to solidify its claim 
that financial aid does not mean that the ESM is liable for the recipient state’s debt. 
The obligation to repay and the necessity for interest are therefore both guarantees 
that the ESM is not assuming the debt of a recipient Member State.27 On top of this, it 
is decisive that the donor institution (either the ESM or Member States) does not act 
as a guarantor for the debts of the recipient Member State. This state must remain 
liable for its own financial obligations towards its creditors.28 
However, the Court remains fairly vague with regard to the conditions of financial aid 
being lawful. Such aid has to be "indispensable"29 for maintaining financial stability 
within the eurozone. This macroeconomic criterion is not described in any further con-
crete fashion and should offer wide leeway in line with the well-established jurispru-
dence of the Court. There is well-established jurisprudence that sets high thresholds 
for the legality review of discretionary economic policy decisions, as has been the case, 
for example, in the area of trade policy and competition law. In these cases, which can, 
by analogy, also apply to monetary and financial stability considerations, the Court 
undertakes a substantial legality review only where there have been obvious and man-
ifest errors or an abuse of discretion.30 
In sum, the Court stipulates that the following conditions be prerequisites for financial 
aid using Article 125 para. 1 TFEU:  
1. The recipient state must remain liable towards its creditors. 
 
                                               
26 Pringle case, para. 139. 
27 On this, see also C. Calliess, ‘Der ESM zwischen Luxemburg und Karlsruhe’, NVwZ (2013), 103. 
28 Pringle case, para. 138. 
29 Pringle case, para. 136. 
30 CJEU 17 Sept. 2007, Case T-201/04, Microsoft v EC Commission; see also CJEU 16 March 2004, 
Case T-118/96, para. 67 (anti-dumping measures); Steinbach, supra n. 3, p. 27. 
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2. The financial aid must be repaid as well as an additional appropriate margin. 
The creation of "new debts", which the recipient country owes the lending insti-
tution as a result of the financial aid, ensures that the lending institution does 
not even indirectly burden itself with the recipient country’s debts. 
 
3. The financial aid must be indispensable for maintaining financial stability within 
the eurozone. For this prerequisite, it is likely that the acting institutions have a 
significant assessment prerogative. In view of the macroeconomic nature of this 
condition, the Court would have to limit itself to a review of evident or manifest 
mistakes. Either way, the Court has in the past left the EU Commission plenty 
of leeway in other cases concerning financial policy. Similarly, in Gauweiler, the 
Court has acknowledged the broad discretion of the ECB, particularly given the 
technical nature and complex assessments at stake.31  
 
4. Financial aid is illegitimate if it leads to an impairment of the incentive for a re-
cipient Member State to pursue a solid budgetary policy. This prerequisite re-
places the market logic behind Article 125 para. 1 TFEU. In order for it to be 
secured, "strict conditionality" must be in place, which is suitable to move the 
Member State to work towards "sound budgetary policies". The condition, too, 
is so abstract and vague32 that its interpretation is left to the margin of assess-
ment that the acting organs have; a Court examination of the suitability of the 
conditions for attaining the goal cannot be overly strict given that the Court 
would typically require a “manifest error of assessment”.33 
 
With these conditions, the European Court of Justice is entirely in line with the German 
Constitutional Court, which outlined criteria for the compatibility of financial aid with the 
German constitution. For the Constitutional Court, too, maintaining the market logic 
                                               
31 Gauweiler case, para. 68. 
32 M. Nettesheim, ‘Europarechtskonformität des Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus’, NJW (2013), p. 
16. 
33 Gauweiler case, para. 74. 
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and its disciplining measure of pressure through interest is central. However, it ob-
serves that financial aid somehow diminishes the principle of national budgets being 
independent and subject to market pressure.34 Instead of a country’s market depend-
ence with regard to its refinancing possibilities, financial assistance between the euro-
zone Member States is granted – only, however, if this is indispensable for the stabili-
sation of the eurozone as a whole.35 Despite the national budgets losing their inde-
pendence, the Constitutional Court still sees the most important condition – the stability 
character of the monetary union – as fulfilled, in particular because the obligation to 
exercise budgetary discipline still remains in force, according to the stipulations laid 
down in Article 126 and 136 TFEU, and the "exceptional" nature still remains in place, 
according to which financial aid must serve currency stability and may only be activated 
once the step becomes indispensable for the stabilisation of the eurozone as a whole.36  
Consequences for the Involvement of Public Creditors 
With such a backdrop, doubts arise concerning individual forms of creditor involve-
ment, namely with regard to the compatibility with the principles laid down in the case 
law.  
First, the connection between the incentive for a solid budget and strict conditionality 
is in doubt whenever the conditions for debt reduction are gradually relaxed. To put it 
in simple terms, the incentive for budget discipline is lower the more substantial the 
acquittal is to repay debts. There are, at most, merely gradual differences. Prolonged 
repayment terms and interest-rate reductions mean that the nominal debt remains, and 
with it the pressure to facilitate repayment through budget consolidation. In the case of 
a (partial) nominal debt reduction, on the other hand, the incentive effect has a height-
ened moral hazard form.37 While the state, in the worst-case scenario, could count on 
                                               
34 BverfG 7 Sept. 2011, Case No. 2 BvR 987/10, 2 BvR 1485/10, 2 BvR 1099/10, para. 181. 
35 BVerfG 12 Sept. 2012, Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12, paras. (1-319), para. 232. 
36 BVerfG 12 Sept. 2012, Case No. 2 BvR 1390/12, paras. (1-319), para. 233. By contrast, the German 
Constitutional Court does not explicitly mention conditionality as a prerequisite. 
37 For a general take on the moral hazard implications of Article 125 TFEU, see M. C. Kerber and S. 
Städter, ‘Ein Beitrag zum Individualrechtsschutz gegen Rechtsverstöße der EZB’, EuZW (2011) p. 536; 
W. Frenz and C. Ehlenz, ‘Europäische Wirtschaftspolitik nach Lissabon’, GewArch (2010) p. 329. 
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financial aid from the other Member States, it can now even speculate about full debt 
remission, which will likely reduce the incentive to consolidate its budget. 
Depending on the kind of debt relief, it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that con-
ditionality-based financial aid represents a functional equivalent to market-based refi-
nancing. The Court's line of argument in the ESM judgement suggests that it acted on 
the assumption of precisely this equivalence between the disciplining effect of market 
mechanisms, on the one hand, and the steering effect of conditionality, on the other.38 
More specifically, the interest rate for bilateral and ESM loans to Greece is already 
significantly below the market-based level. Any further easing of interest payments 
would weaken the functional equivalence, assumed by the Court, between regular in-
terest-based market pressure and conditionality-based state pressure. It would com-
pletely dissolve in the case of a debt cancellation. As long as both the term and the 
interest are set at least in the vicinity of the refinancing conditions that markets require, 
too, we might still be able to speak of comparable market conditions and thus functional 
equivalence.39 This appears more and more doubtful, however, the more the interest 
payment standard is lowered. Should the credits be transformed into long-term, inter-
est-free loans, it would be increasingly questionable to speak of a comparability of 
market conditions and restrictions. 
Second, debt relief calls into question the Court’s criterion that there must not be liabil-
ity of the ESM (or Member States) for the debts a recipient state has towards its cred-
itors. As mentioned above, every debt reduction occurs within a bilateral framework 
between the debt reliever and the recipient state, ignoring the relation to third parties. 
However, this means that the debt-relieving countries themselves become creditors of 
the programme countries by means of the financial aid. If the debt-relieving countries 
waived repayment, they would assume liability for the loans owed to them implying 
incompatibility with Article 125 para. 1 TFEU.  
                                               
38 Nettesheim, supra n. 32, p. 16, who casts doubt on this connection with regard to the ESM. 
39 Clearly, difficulties in drawing such comparison result from the fact that market-based bond spreads 
do not reflect a state’s fundamentals but are rather determined by negative self-fulfilling market senti-
ments, see P. De Grauwe and Y. Ji, ‘Self-fulfilling crises in the Eurozone: An empirical test’, 34 Journal 
of International Money and Finance (2013) p. 15-36.  
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Third, the obligation to repay is revoked – at least in the case of the (partial) debt 
waiver; and it is this obligation that the Court, in its ESM judgement, presented as proof 
that the financial aid would not waive an existing debt of the recipient country, but 
instead create a new one.40 The "appropriate margin" referred to in the ESM judgement 
is also increasingly called into question, as a result of interest rate cuts on and term 
extensions, and done away with entirely in the case of debt relief. 
Fourth, and finally, (public) creditor involvement is less obviously justifiable through the 
argument of a necessity for “safeguarding of the stability of the euro area", as is the 
case with financial aid under the ESM. Financial aid granted under the ESM is tied to 
instances where a country’s refinancing ability is at stake and the debt default the al-
ternative to non-granting financial support. By contrast, debt relief does not serve to 
ensure short-term solvency, but rather rests on the long-term forecast of whether the 
prospective growth path of a country allows a repayment of its debts.41 However, we 
can suppose from a political-economy perspective that all forms of future debt reduc-
tion, from interest rebates to a complete haircut, would be enacted on the claim that it 
would be indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
restoring of Greek debt sustainability and the prior involvement of private creditors are 
likely to be used as arguments for the inevitability of such a step.42 Since by the mere 
nature of the situation we are dealing with hardly verifiable economic assessments, 
this opinion ought at least not to be vitiated by a manifest error of assessment.43 We 
can also expect an attempt to use the maintenance of conditionality as proof that these 
measures ensure the adhesion to budget discipline. However, this line of argument 
remains unconvincing. While financial aid is supposed to prevent harmful conse-
quences for the financial stability of the euro area, it is difficult to see how a debt relief 
would likewise be indispensable for the stability of the euro area. At the core rather lies 
                                               
40 Pringle case, para. 139. 
41 On the concept of debt sustainability, see, for instance, IMF and World Bank, The Challenge of Main-
taining Long-Term External Debt Sustainability, 20 April 2001, <www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/hipc/2001/lt/042001.pdf>, last visited 30 Jan. 2016. 
42 On debt cuts for private creditors, see A. C. Porzecanski, Behind the Greek default and restructuring 
of 2012 (MPRA Paper No. 44178 2012). 
43 Gauweiler case, para. 74. 
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the securing of debt sustainability and hence a fuzzy, discretionary criterion that is 
turned into a prerequisite mainly by the IMF to become involved in the financial aid.44  
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear why an interpretation of the Pringle judgment, 
which would permit a haircut if it was indispensable for the stability of the euro area 
should be rejected.45 According to this interpretation, the Court held that the Treaties 
allow bailouts to bring a country back on track and to make market forces operative 
again. One might apply the same reasoning if the bail-out turns out to be unsuccessful, 
bringing the country into a situation where it needs debt relief to get back on track. 
However, in light of the above analysis this view seems to be untenable both in view 
of the clear wording of Article 125 TFEU and the Court’s reasoning in Pringle. First, 
while credits granted through the ESM lead to an additional debt of only temporary 
nature, debt relief through haircut extinguishes debt and does so permanently – this is 
a significant qualitative difference encroaching with the no-bailout principle. Second, 
reading Pringle as to the effect that conditionality renders any kind of support or haircut 
admissible overburdens the conditionality requirement, the function of which is to be 
an equivalent to market-based refinancing. Third and from an effect-based perspec-
tive, the greater the potential for debt relief, the lower are the incentives to pursue solid 
budgets further undermining the intention of the no-bailout clause. And fourth, it re-
mains unclear how the long term concern of fiscal sustainability can jeopardise the 
financial stability of the eurozone as such. 
Debt Relief on the Basis of the Solidarity Principle? 
While a haircut on nominal debt runs counter to Article 125 para. 1 TFEU, one could 
consider a justification based on the solidarity principle, which is rooted in the EU Trea-
ties.46 It has been suggested, in the context of financial aid, that the solidarity principle 
                                               
44 On the diverging approaches in assessing debt sustainability see J. Schumacher and Beatrice Weder 
di Mauro, Diagnosing Greek debt sustainability: Why is it so hard? (Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 26 Aug. 2015). 
45 In this vein, see A. von Bogdandy et al., supra n. 9, p. 6. 
46 On the basis of Article 2 TFEU, solidarity is a foundational value of the European Union. For express 
references to the principle of solidarity, see Articles 21 and 24 para. 2 and 3 of the TFEU, as well as 
Articles 67, 80, 122, 194 and 222 of the TFEU. C. Boutayeb, ‘La solidarité, un principe immanent au 
droit de l´Union européenne’, in C. Boutayeb (ed.), La solidarité dans l´Union européenne (Dalloz, 2011) 
p. 5-37. 
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should gain more relevance within the interpretative scope of Article 125 para. 1 
TFEU.47 In accordance with Article 4 para. 3 EUT, the solidarity principle creates an 
effect, via its procedural dimension (loyalty to the Union), of the Member States and 
the EU working together loyally with a view to maintaining the monetary union.48 On 
that basis, a solidarity principle thus understood produces a teleological reduction of 
the scope of the prohibition of Article 125 para. 1 TFEU, allowing for temporary financial 
aid in the interest of maintaining the monetary union subject to certain conditions.49  
This approach seems plausible to the extent that it constitutes a kind of "practical con-
cordance" between the different interpretations of Article 125 para. 1 TFEU and the 
solidarity principle.50 The previous financial assistance programmes are in accordance 
with this. However, the approach has its limits in the case of debt relief. If the solidarity 
principle were used to justify any financial support, including a complete debt cut, thus 
releasing the recipient state from its obligations, then Article 125 para. 1 TFEU would 
be completely undermined. However, the solidarity principle cannot be used as to dis-
regard the aim and wording of other treaty provisions. This would be the case here: 
The market logic inherent in Article 125 para. 1 TFEU and the express prohibition of 
liability for the debts of other Member States would at least be breached by debt relief 
in the guise of a cut of the nominal debt.  
A Debt Waiver on the Part of the ECB 
Another way of involving the creditors is an involvement of the ECB through the gov-
ernment bonds it holds in its portfolio. In reaction to the debt crisis, the ECB Governing 
Council had initially activated its Securities Markets Programme, in May 2010.51 Then, 
                                               
47 On this, see Calliess, supra n. 18, p. 222 and 268; see also I. Domurath, ‘The Three Dimensions of 
Solidarity in the EU Legal Order: Limits of the Judicial and Legal Approach’, 35 European Integration 
(2013) p. 459-475. 
48 More generally: M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU Law (Oxford University Press 2014). 
49 On the solidarity dimension of the relevant norms in Article 122 TFEU and Article 125 TFEU, see P. 
Hilpold, ‘Understanding solidarity within EU law: An analysis of the “islands of solidarity” with particular 
regard to Monetary Union’, 34 Yearbook of European Law (2015) p. 257-285. 
50 On the relationship of the solidarity principle and the interpretation of Article 125 TFEU, see Opinion 
of Advocate General Kokott in Pringle case, paras. 142-143. In her view, a wide interpretation of Article 
125 TFEU banning all kind of financial support would lead to undesirable results.  
51 ECB, Decision of 14 May 2010 (ECB/2010/5), OJ 2010, L124/8. 
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the decision of the ECB Governing Council on technical features of OMT was taken on 
6 September 2012 following Draghi’s “whatever it takes”-message. According to this 
decision, the ECB would, if necessary and under strict conditions, lift the market pres-
sure on struggling Euro states through bond purchases on the secondary market pro-
vided these states accept conditionality under the EFSF/ESM programme.52 With such 
measures, the ECB aims at securing the implementation of a fiscal policy directed at 
price stability. 
 
One may consider haircuts involving the ECB in light of the European Court of Justice’s 
Gauweiler judgment, which found secondary market purchases motivated by monetary 
policy considerations to be in line with Article 123 TFEU (enshrining the ban on mone-
tary financing).53 The main dispute between the Court and the German Constitutional 
Court concerned the nature of the bond purchases, falling either in the monetary policy 
domain (European Court of Justice) or into Member States’ economic policy compe-
tence (German Constitutional Court).54 In addition, and possibly relevant for the issue 
of debt restructuring, we have the Court’s acknowledgement in Gauweiler of the broad 
discretion of the ECB, particularly given the technical nature and complex assessments 
at stake.55 Hence, the OMT programme was not vitiated by a manifest error of assess-
ment,56 and the ECB could reasonably take the view that the OMT programme was 
appropriate for the purpose of contributing to the ECB’s objectives and therefore to 
maintaining price stability. 
 
In light of the broad discretion granted to the ECB57, one may also consider the ECB’s 
leeway when thinking about participation in debt restructuring. However, the Court’s 
                                               
52 European Central Bank, Press Release, Technical Features of Outright Monetary Transactions, 6 
September 2012, <www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2012/html/pr120906_1.en.html>, last visited 30 
Jan. 2016. 
53 Gauweiler case; Steinbach, supra n. 3; differently Siekmann, supra n. 3. 
54 Borger, supra n. 3; Steinbach, supra n. 3. 
55 Gauweiler case, para. 68; on the wide margin of the ECB see also Steinbach, supra n. 3, p. 27. 
56 Gauweiler case, para. 74. 
57 More generally on the marginal review standard of the proportionality analysis undertaken by the 
European Court of Justice, Türk, Judicial Review in EU Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), p. 137. 
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insistence in Gauweiler on the motivation of the OMT programme being based on mon-
etary policy considerations makes clear that any discretion held by the ECB would 
have to be tied to its monetary policy mandate. In other words, agreeing to a haircut 
must be driven by monetary policy purposes and not by fiscal policy considerations. 
Consequently, a monetary policy rationale is needed, according to which a high overall 
debt burden (but not only high short-term refinancing costs as expressed by bond 
spreads and justifying the OMT programme) is an impediment to the smooth function-
ing of monetary policy. In principle, in Gauweiler the Court seems to accept the theo-
retical possibility that government bonds purchased by the ECB can lose value in the 
case of a debt default – a typical market risk.58 The Court is referring here to standard 
ECB open market operations, for instance, which do carry a market risk and a loss risk, 
but always have (or should always have) a monetary policy motivation.59  
 
By contrast, if the ECB initially purchases government bonds for monetary policy pur-
poses in order to ensure the transmission mechanism, and if a debt cut on purchased 
bonds occurs later for fiscal reasons improving a Member State’s debt sustainability, 
this would have to be viewed as forbidden monetary financing of governments.60 A 
debt waiver would then be tantamount to redefining the initial reason for the purchase 
(the monetary policy motivation), if the purchase is used retroactively to save states 
from bankruptcy by financially stabilising them.61 
 
It then turns out to be an empirical question whether monetary policy or fiscal policy 
motivations would be driving the motive behind a haircut. At this stage, fiscal policy 
looms prominently in the public debate, which focuses mainly on Greece’s debt unsus-
tainability without reference to monetary policy concerns.62 This would thus be a situ-
ation where debt relief is actively and purposefully pursued by the ECB for fiscal policy 
                                               
58 Gauweiler case, para.125. 
59 Cf. Article 18.1. ECB-Statute. 
60 See also F. Schorkopf, Stellungnahme Europäische Zentralbank, 16 January 2013, 52; P. Sester, 
‘Die Rolle der EZB in der europäischen Staatsschuldenkrise’, EWS (2012), p. 85; 
61 F. Gianviti et al., European Mechanism For Sovereign Debt Crisis Resolution: A Proposal (Bruegel 
Blueprint 10 2010) p. 10. 
62 IMF, Greece, IMF Country Report No. 15/165, 26 June 2015, <www.imf.org/exter-
nal/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15165.pdf>, last visited 30 Jan. 2016. 
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reasons, the goal being an improvement of debt sustainability rather than having its 
primary motivation in monetary policy. Such a debt cut would seem to be inadmissible 
for the Court, given the Court’s lengthy justification of the OMT programme due to the 
monetary policy aim pursued by the ECB. Advocate General Villalón was even clearer 
on this point. For him, for the compatibility with Article 123 TFEU it was decisive that 
"the ECB will not actively contribute to bringing about a restructuring but will seek to 
recover in full the claim securitised on the bond".63 With the Advocate General’s abun-
dantly clear rejection of an involvement of the ECB in a haircut, the statement should 
be restrictively interpreted as to debt restructurings pertaining to fiscal policy and sus-
tainability reasons – an ECB that actively pursues a debt cut for fiscal policy purposes 
acts unlawfully.64 
 
The question remains what the term “actively” could mean and how it relates to the 
practical implementation of haircuts, particularly given the relevance of collective action 
clauses. In this regard, in the course of the private haircut undertaken during the finan-
cial crisis of 2011-2012, the Greek government introduced a retroactive collective ac-
tion clause setting a majority threshold of 66,67 per cent to agree to a debt restructuring 
that is conclusive and legally binding on all holders of the bond. However, the ECB 
was exempted from this haircut perpetuating the mutual dependency between Greece 
and its public lenders including the ECB.65 Also, euro area model of collective action 
clauses requiring a supermajority of 75 per cent have been introduced on the basis of 
the ESM Treaty and made compulsory for euro area government securities with a ma-
turity of over one year.66 While it will take a number of years until euro collective action 
clauses are contained in the majority of euro area sovereign bonds, there is some 
                                               
63 Opinion of Advocate General Villalón in Gauweiler case, para. 235. 
64 This analysis extends to the Eurosystem's expanded asset purchase programme. The programme 
was launched on 22 Jan. 2015 and forsees combined monthly purchases of EUR 60 billion in public and 
private sector securities including the public sector purchase programme (PSPP) of marketable debt 
instruments issued by euro area central governments. All these entities are public sector entities and 
are thus subject to the ban of monetary financing under Article 123 TFEU, which prohibits the extension 
of direct credit to public sector entities or sovereigns. 
65 Zettelmeyer et al., supra n. 6, pp. 550, 554. 
66 This was based on the conclusions of the European Council of 24/25 March 2011 and developed by 
the Economic and Financial Committee (EFC) on 18 Nov. 2011, see <europa.eu/efc/sub_commit-
tee/cac/cac_2012/index_en.htm>, last visited 30 Jan. 2016. 
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likelihood that the ECB could be involved in a haircut involving collective action 
clauses. It is at least a possible scenario that the ECB would hold less than 25 per cent 
and would thus not be able to block the debt restructuring. This may be precisely the 
situation where the term “actively” as used by Advocate General Villalón becomes rel-
evant – the ECB would be obliged to block the haircut where possible but would have 
to accept it where its vote is overridden by other bond holders.67 
 
Another issue in this context is the role of the national central banks of the eurosystem. 
This issue raises the question of the independence of national central banks both from 
the ECB and national governments. A distinction must be made between bond pur-
chases that national central banks undertook within their tasks under the eurosystem 
and those they performed outside the eurosystem within the ambit of Art. 14.4. ECB-
Statute – national central banks may purchase bonds under this provision on their own 
account for reasons other than monetary policy.68 In principle and as stated above, 
Article 123 TFEU would prohibit any consent to a haircut if aiming at debt relief, as 
even under the national central bank’s independent leeway there must be no infringe-
ment of EU law. In fact, according to Article 14.4. of the ECB Statute, the ECB Council 
can prohibit any measure of a national central bank in case of incompatibility with the 
goals and tasks of the ECB. In addition, there is an issue of independence if national 
central banks are demanded by their national governments to cast their votes on a 
modification of the bond terms.69 In this case, Article 130 TFEU should shield the na-
tional central banks’ autonomy from any national influence. However, since national 
central banks cannot perform monetary policy, which lies exclusively with the eurosys-
tem, any debt restructuring would be of fiscal policy nature and thus incompatible with 
Article 123 TFEU. It should therefore be prohibited by the ECB Council. 
 
                                               
67 Similarly, Zilioli, 23 MJ 1 (2016), 171, 176. 
68 On the task-sharing among the ECB and the national central banks see A. Steinbach, ‘The Lender of 
Last Resort in the Euro Area’, CMLRev (2016), 365-366.  
69 C. Hofmann, ‘Sovereign-Debt Restructuring in Europe Under the New Model Collective Action 
Clauses’, 49 Texas International Law Journal (2014) p. 383 at p. 417. 
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In sum, lawful participation of the ECB in a debt restructuring on the sovereign bonds 
it holds in its portfolio is limited to the unlikely scenario (until now, that is) that this would 
be necessary for primarily monetary policy purposes – the sole purpose of boosting 
fiscal debt sustainability does not meet the standards of the ban on monetary financing.  
 
Conclusion 
The toolkit used so far to fight the public debt crisis, consisting of bilateral loans, lines 
of credit from the EFSF and the ESM, private creditor involvement and ECB bond pur-
chases, could soon be extended to include public creditors. It seems that only in this 
way can Greece’s debt sustainability be restored in the long term. Rate cuts, extended 
credit periods, interest-free borrowings and a debt cut are all different forms of involving 
creditors. From a legal point of view, a (partial) cut of the nominal debt, a transformation 
into long-term, interest-free loans and a debt cut in the case of the government bonds 
in the ECB portfolio all present cause for concern. 
A (partial) cut of the nominal debt violates the bailout prohibition, as this causes the 
debt-assuming euro states to enter into obligations that debtor states have with them. 
Further, the functional equivalence between conditionality and interest-based market 
pressure, as imputed by the Court, no longer exists. Also, the repayment obligation, 
highlighted in the ESM judgement, would be rescinded, along with the interest. The 
moral hazard problem created as a result of financial aid would worsen. As for interest-
free debt securities, the Court’s margin requirement would be abandoned, which 
means an element would be lost that permits the assumption of an equivalence of the 
conditionality and the market conditions. However, there is scope to argue that it makes 
no difference to the analysis whether the programme country pays only minimal inter-
est – as is the case today – or no interest at all. Neither one case nor the other is in 
line with regular market conditions, but it could still be argued that the logic of functional 
equivalence between market pressure and conditionality is upheld to the extent that 
the obligation to repay loans at nominal value remains in place. Small modifications of 
the financial aid, in the guise of interest rate reductions, deferral of interest payments 
and term extensions, which have been granted to programme countries in the past, 
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are less critical.70 The basic structure – i.e., the obligation to repay with interest – re-
mains unaltered by this.  
From a political-economy perspective, significant barriers seem to result from (Ger-
man) politicians’ resistance to take on debt cuts openly, to the detriment of national 
taxpayers. In turn, this makes creativity in searching for legitimate alternatives to the 
kinds of debt cuts described above even more urgent. This may imply making it easier 
to access EU structural funds (potentially expanded through the newly established Eu-
ropean Fund for Strategic Investments71), or using profits made by the ECB through 
bond purchases and paid to Member States. To that end, the eurozone Member States 
have passed on to Greece the profits made by the ECB through its monetary policy 
operations in relation to the purchase of Greek government securities.72 Finally, signif-
icant debt relief would be achieved by using the ESM for the bailouts hitherto under-
taken by the crisis states to save their banks. This kind of direct capitalisation of the 
banks through the ESM, however, is highly controversial in many Member States. This 
led to the establishment of a Single Resolution Mechanism funded by a Resolution 
Fund intended to shield taxpayers from costly bailouts of banks.73 
                                               
70 See the Eurogroup statement on Greece, 27 Nov. 2012, < www.consilium.europa.eu/en/worka-
rea/downloadAsset.aspx?id=19043>, last visited 30 Jan. 2016, p. 2. 
71 Regulation (EU) No. 2015/1017 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 June 2015 on 
the European Fund for Strategic Investments, the European Investment Advisory Hub and the European 
Investment Project Portal and amending Regulations (EU) No 1291/2013 and (EU) No 1316/2013 - the 
European Fund for Strategic Investments, OJ 2015, L 169/1. 
72 Eurogroup statement, 21 Feb. 2012, last visited 25 Oct. 2015. 
73 A. Kern, ‘European Banking Union: A Legal and Institutional Analysis of the Single Supervisory Mech-
anism and the Single Resolution Mechanism’, European Law Review (2015) p. 154-187. 
